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VIOLATING EQUAL PROTECTION:
LYNCH V. MORALES-SANTANA
AND THE INA’S SEX
DISCRIMINATORY PHYSICAL
PRESENCE REQUIREMENT
COURTNEY MAGNUS∗
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution’s equal protection guarantee prevents
legislatures from drawing distinctions solely on the basis of sex.1
Nevertheless, “our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination.”2 The Court first invalidated a statute for
discriminating on the basis of sex in 1971.3 Since then, the Court has
applied intermediate scrutiny to laws that discriminate against both
men and women on the basis of their gender.4 Laws cannot be based
on “overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities,
or preferences of male and females.”5
The laws regarding when an unwed parent’s citizenship can be
passed on to a child born abroad have played a role in this country’s
history of sex discrimination.6 For example, under the statutes at issue
in Lynch v. Morales-Santana,7 an unwed U.S. citizen father cannot
convey citizenship at-birth to his child unless he has been physically
present in the United States for ten years prior to the child’s birth,
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1. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.”).
2. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1977).
3. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
5. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
6. Brief Amici Curiae of Professors of History, Political Science, and Law in Support of
Respondent at 2, Lynch v. Morales-Santana, NO. 15-1191 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2016).
7. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) (1952).
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while an unwed U.S. citizen mother need only be present for one
continuous year. By invalidating this statutory scheme the Court can
take a step towards removing sex-discrimination from derivative
citizenship laws.
This commentary argues that the Supreme Court should apply
intermediate scrutiny to invalidate the scheme set forth by §§ 1401
and 1409 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) because it
discriminates on the basis of a parent’s gender. Further, the Court
should remedy this equal protection violation by applying the shorter
physical presence requirement, which currently applies only to
mothers, to both genders.
FACTS
Luis Ramon Morales-Santana was born in the Dominican
Republic in 1962 to unmarried parents.8 Morales-Santana’s mother
was a citizen of the Dominican Republic.9 His father was born in
Puerto Rico and became a United States citizen in 1917 through the
Jones Act.10 He was physically present in Puerto Rico until he left to
work for a U.S. company in the Dominican Republic, just twenty days
short of his nineteenth birthday.11
In 1970, Morales-Santana’s parents married, which legitimated
him in accordance with § 1409(a).12 At the age of thirteen, he moved
to the United States where he continued to live for more than forty
years.13
In 2000, after several felony convictions, Morales-Santana was
placed into removal proceedings.14 Morales-Santana claimed he
should not be removed because he had obtained derivative citizenship
at birth from his father.15 The immigration judge denied his
application.16 Morales-Santana filed a motion to reopen, claiming that
the statutes governing derivative citizenship violated his father’s right

8. Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 521, 524 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct.
2545 (2016).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Brief for Respondent at 10, Lynch v. Morales-Santana, NO. 15-1191 (U.S. Sept. 26,
2016) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
12. Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 524.
13. Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 10.
14. Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 524.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.17 His derivative
citizenship claim was again rejected and the Bureau of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) denied his motion to reopen.18
Under the INA of 1952, the statute in effect at the time of
Morales-Santana’s birth, an unwed citizen mother could provide
citizenship at birth to her child, born abroad with a non-citizen father,
as long as the mother was “physically present in the United States or
one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year” at
any point prior to the child’s birth.19 In contrast, an unwed citizen
father could not provide derivative citizenship to a child born abroad
to a non-citizen mother unless he was “physically present in the
United States or one of its outlying possessions for a period or period
totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after
attaining the age of fourteen years” prior to the child’s birth.20
Having left Puerto Rico just twenty days before his nineteenth
birthday, Morales-Santana’s father was unable to satisfy the statutory
requirement to provide derivative citizenship at birth to his son.21 He
did, however, satisfy the requirement that applies to unwed citizen
mothers.22
Morales-Santana asked the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit to review the BIA’s decision to deny his motion
for citizenship. He argued that the gender-based difference in the
physical presence requirements imposed under §§ 1409(c) and
1401(a)(7) that places a more onerous burden on unwed fathers,
violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.23 The
Second Circuit agreed with Morales-Santana and held that he had
acquired derivative citizenship at birth from his father.24 The
Government petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme
Court of the United States, which was granted on June 28, 2016.25

17. Id. at 524–25.
18. Id. at 525.
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1952).
20. § 1401(a)(7) (1952). The disparate treatment of unwed citizen mothers and fathers
remains in the current version of the statutes. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1409 (a) and (c) (2012) (requiring
that unwed citizen fathers be physically present for five years with at least two of those years
being after the age of fourteen, while unwed citizen mothers are still subject to the same oneyear continuous presence requirement).
21. Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 523.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 523–24.
24. Id.
25. Lynch v. Morales-Santana, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states
that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.”26 The Supreme Court has held that this
right applies to the federal government through the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.27
Laws that discriminate on the basis of gender are reviewed under
intermediate scrutiny.28 To survive intermediate scrutiny, the
government must have an “exceedingly persuasive” justification for
using the gender classification.29 The government is required to show
“at least that the [challenged] classification serves ‘important
government objectives and that the discriminatory means employed
are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”30 The
justification must be “genuine, not hypothesized or invented post
hoc.”31 Furthermore, the justification may not “rely on overbroad
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences
of males and females.”32 The burden of proving that a gender
classification satisfies intermediate scrutiny is “demanding and it rests
entirely on the State.”33
The Court’s decision in Fiallo v. Bell34 has made how or whether
intermediate scrutiny should be applied in the context of immigration,
citizenship, and naturalization murky. In Fiallo, the Court considered
a challenge by a group of alien fathers and children to an Immigration
and Naturalization Service provision that provided a special
immigration preference based on a relationship to a citizen mother,
but not a father.35 In deference to Congress’s plenary powers of
immigration and naturalization, the Court declined to apply
heightened scrutiny.36
In Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS,37 the Court reviewed the equal
protection implications of § 1409(a), which requires that unwed
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
Id.
Id. (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
Id.
Id. (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975)).
Id. (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
430 U.S. 787 (1977).
Id. at 788.
Id. at 799.
533 U.S. 53 (2001).
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citizen fathers, but not mothers, legitimate their children born abroad
in order to provide citizenship at birth.38 The Court held that the
gender classification was substantially related to ensuring “that a
biological parent-child relationship exists”39 and to ensuring that there
would be “real, everyday ties that provide a connection between child
and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.”40 In reaching this
holding, the Court relied on the fact that women but not men are
biologically required to be present at a child’s birth.41 Because the
Court found that the classification withstood intermediate scrutiny, it
did not have to decide whether a lesser form of scrutiny should apply
in deference to Congress’s plenary powers.42
In 2008, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the physical presence
requirements at issue here, assuming, without deciding, that
heightened scrutiny applied.43 The court upheld the differing physical
presence requirements, recognizing the Government’s interests in
preventing statelessness and ensuring children born abroad would
have sufficient ties to the United States.44 The Ninth Circuit held that
the fit between the gender classification and asserted interests was
“sufficiently persuasive in light of the virtually plenary power that
Congress has to legislate in the area of immigration and citizenship.”45
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision by an
equally divided court.46
III. HOLDING
In Morales-Santana, the Second Circuit reversed the BIA’s
decision, holding that the gender-based difference in the physical
presence requirement scheme imposed by §§ 1409(c) and 1401(a)(7)
is an equal protection violation.47 The court determined the proper
remedy was to apply the shorter physical presence requirement, which
applies to unwed citizen mothers, to unwed citizen fathers as well and
38. Id. at 59–60.
39. Id. at 62.
40. Id. at 64–65.
41. Id. at 62.
42. Id.
43. United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 564 U.S. 210
(2011).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210, 210 (2011).
47. Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 521, 524 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct.
2545 (2016).
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that accordingly, Morales-Santana had obtained derivative citizenship
at birth from his father.48
After quickly rejecting Morales-Santana’s arguments that his
father had satisfied the physical presence requirement,49 the Second
Circuit determined that intermediate scrutiny should be applied.50 The
Government urged the court to apply rational basis review in
accordance with Fiallo v. Bell.51 The Second Circuit distinguished
Fiallo because, unlike the plaintiffs in Fiallo who were aliens seeking
admission to the United States, Morales-Santana claimed to have
“pre-existing citizenship at birth.”52 Morales-Santana’s equal
protection claim therefore did not “implicate Congress’s ‘power to
admit or exclude foreigners.’”53 The court also noted that the Supreme
Court had the opportunity to apply Fiallo to gender-based
distinctions in § 1409 in Miller, Nguyen, and Flores-Villar, but did not
do so.54
The court then applied intermediate scrutiny to the Government’s
asserted interests.55 With respect to the Government’s first interest,
“ensur[ing] that foreign-born children of parents of different
nationalities have a sufficient connection to the United States to
warrant citizenship,” the court could find no explanation for why
“unwed fathers need more time than unwed mothers . . . to assimilate
the values that the statute seeks to ensure are passed on to citizen
children born abroad.”56 The court did not find the Government’s
reliance on Nguyen convincing because Morales-Santana’s father
legitimated him, thereby ensuring that a biological tie and
opportunity to have a meaningful relationship existed.57 The court
noted that although “unwed mothers and father are not similarly
situated” when it comes to the biologically-based ties in Nguyen, they
“are similarly situated with respect to how long they should be
present . . . in order to have assimilated citizenship-related values to
transmit to the child.”58 Requiring a longer physical presence
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 529.
Id. at 528.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 528–29.
Id. at 530.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 530–31.
Id. at 531 (emphasis in original).
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requirement for unwed citizen fathers is therefore “not substantially
related to the goal of ensuring a sufficient connection between citizen
children and the United States.”59
The Government’s second asserted interest was preventing
statelessness.60 The court examined the congressional hearings and
reports relating to the 1940 and 1952 versions of the Act and could
find no evidence that statelessness was actually an underlying
concern.61 Furthermore, even if preventing statelessness was a
motivating factor, it did not satisfy intermediate scrutiny because an
effective gender-neutral alternative was available.62
Having found that basing different physical presence requirements
on gender violates equal protection, the court turned to determining
the appropriate remedy. The court held that the one-year continuous
presence requirement should apply to children born abroad to both
unwed citizen fathers and mothers, and thereby recognized that
Morales-Santana had obtained derivative citizenship at birth from his
father.63 Neither the text of the statute nor the legislative history were
conclusive with regard to the proper remedy, so the court looked to
binding precedent which “cautions [the court] to extend rather than
contract benefits.”64 In response to the Government’s argument that
this remedy grants citizenship, which the court lacks the power to give,
the Second Circuit asserted that it was not creating citizenship, but
rather recognizing Morales-Santana’s pre-existing citizenship by
remedying a constitutional defect.65
IV. ARGUMENTS
Lynch v. Morales-Santana involves two main issues. First, whether
the scheme established by §§ 1401 and 1409, which requires unwed
citizen fathers to fulfill a substantially longer physical presence
requirement than unwed citizen mothers in order to transmit
derivative citizenship to their foreign-born children, violates the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. Second, whether the
Second Circuit provided the appropriate remedy.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 532–33.
Id. at 534.
Id. at 524.
Id. at 537.
Id.
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A. The Government’s Arguments
The Government argues that the Court should apply rational basis
review, because it should defer to Congress’s plenary power over
naturalization.66 Therefore, the Second Circuit erred by declining to
follow Fiallo.67 Deciding whether or not children born abroad should
be citizens falls within Congress’s exclusive authority.68 Courts are not
“well-positioned to second-guess Congress’s complex judgments” in
this area.69
Next, the Government argues that the gender-based physical
presence scheme is constitutional even under heightened scrutiny.70
The Government first asserts that the differing physical presence
requirements are substantially related to ensuring that citizenship is
only extended to children born abroad who have “sufficiently robust
connection[s]” to the United States.71 When only one parent of a child
born abroad is a U.S. citizen, that child is “subject to competing claims
of national allegiance,” which therefore requires a “stronger
connection to the United States.”72
The Government further argues that while § 1409 does use the
terms “mother” and “father,” it is not doing so because of gender, but
out of recognition that at the time of birth an unwed mother has a
legal relationship to her child, while an unwed father does not.73 The
risk of competing national allegiances is reduced when the only
legally recognized parent is a U.S. citizen.74 Therefore, Congress
decided that unwed mothers could fulfill a shorter physical presence
requirement, more similar to what is required of two married U.S.
citizen parents of a child born abroad.75 The Government also relies
on Nguyen, and the proposition that “unwed U.S.-citizen mothers and
unwed U.S.-citizen fathers are not similarly situated in every respect”
at the time of a child’s birth.76

66. Brief for Petitioner at 8–9, Lynch v. Morales-Santana, NO. 15-1191 (U.S. Aug. 19,
2016) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
67. Id. at 17.
68. Id. at 14.
69. Id. at 16.
70. Id. at 9.
71. Id. at 18.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 10.
74. Id. at 9.
75. Id. at 10.
76. Id. at 39.
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Additionally, the Government argues that §§ 1401 and 1409 are
substantially related to reducing statelessness.77 The shorter physical
presence requirement for unwed citizen mothers reflects Congress’s
finding that the risk of statelessness was greater for children born
abroad to unwed citizen mothers.78
Finally, the Government argues that the Second Circuit did not
apply the appropriate remedy.79 Only Congress has the authority to
confer citizenship, but the Second Circuit’s remedy extends
citizenship to Morales-Santana and “an untold number of individuals”
whose parents did not meet the statutory requirements set by
Congress.80 Furthermore, it “could not be more clear that Congress
intended . . . to impose substantial physical-presence requirements in
order for the children born abroad of one U.S.-citizen parent and one
alien parent to acquire U.S. citizenship from birth.”81 Therefore, if §§
1401 and 1409 do violate equal protection, the proper remedy is to
apply the longer physical presence requirement to children born
abroad to both unwed citizen mothers and fathers.82
B. Morales-Santana’s Arguments
Morales-Santana argues that the Second Circuit correctly held
that the physical presence requirements in §§ 1401 and 1409
unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of gender.83 Sections 1401
and 1409 facially discriminate on the basis of sex and therefore must
be subject to heightened scrutiny.84 Fiallo should not be relied upon to
apply a more deferential standard of review.85 Unlike the petitioners
in Fiallo, Morales-Santana claims that a U.S. citizen, his father, is
being subjected to sex discrimination.86 Also, Morales-Santana “does
not claim . . . any new immigration status, but instead claims
preexisting citizenship at birth.”87
Additionally, Morales-Santana argues that the gender-based
physical presence requirement scheme is not substantially related to
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 49–50.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 12.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 15.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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either of the Government’s asserted interests, but instead reflects
“archaic and overbroad gender stereotypes.”88 Morales-Santana notes
that there is no evidence that Congress enacted this scheme to ensure
foreign-born children have strong ties to the United States89 and that,
in fact, it serves to reduce the likelihood that children born abroad to
U.S. citizen mothers will have these ties.90 Even if Congress’s purpose
were to ensure a child born abroad would have a strong connection to
the United States, the physical presence scheme is overbroad because
it allows a U.S. citizen mother who only spent the first year of her life
in the United States to pass on citizenship to her child.91
In response to the Government’s argument that the term
“mother” is simply used to denote the only legally recognized parent
at birth, Morales-Santana contends that “‘the moment of birth’ is not
dispositive, for the statute permits at-birth citizenship to be conferred
retroactively upon the legitimation of the child” by his father.92
Nguyen also does not support the constitutionality of this scheme
because the “discriminatory physical presence requirements at issue
here do not account for biological differences” of mothers and
fathers.93 Once an unwed citizen father legitimates his child, he is
similarly situated to an unwed citizen mother with respect to how long
he needs to have been present in the United States in order to pass on
strong national allegiance to his child.94
Morales-Santana also contends that physical presence
requirements do not reduce the risk of statelessness.95 There is no
evidence that Congress was actually concerned about statelessness
when enacting §§ 1401 and 1409,96 and the historical record
undermines the Government’s argument that the risk of statelessness
was greater for children born to unwed citizen mothers.97
Furthermore, the ten-year physical presence requirement actually
88. Id. at 19.
89. Id. at 20.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 27–28.
92. Id. at 12.
93. Id. at 27 (emphasis in original).
94. See id. (observing that “there is no reason to suppose ‘that unwed fathers need more
time than unwed mothers in the United States . . . to assimilate the values the statute seeks to
ensure are passed on to citizen children born abroad.’”).
95. Id. at 30.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 13.
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increases the risk of statelessness for children born abroad to unwed
citizen fathers.98
In addition, Morales-Santana argues that the poor fit between the
gender-based physical presence requirements and the Government’s
asserted interests demonstrates that the distinction between mothers
and fathers is actually based on “archaic and overbroad stereotypes
reflecting ‘fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males
and females.’”99 The administrative and legislative history confirms
that Congress required unwed citizen mothers to fulfill a shorter
physical presence requirement because “mothers, not fathers, are the
‘natural guardians’ and primary caretakers of nonmarital children.”100
Finally, Morales-Santana argues the Second Circuit applied the
correct remedy by extending the shorter physical presence
requirement to unwed citizen fathers.101 The court did not exceed its
authority in holding that Morales-Santana is a citizen because it did
not grant a new right of citizenship to him, but rather confirmed his
pre-existing citizenship that was evident once the constitutional defect
in the statute was corrected.102
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court should affirm the Second Circuit’s decision and hold
that §§ 1401 and 1409’s physical presence requirements violate the
equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. The Court
previously considered the equal protection implications of this
gender-based, physical presence requirement scheme in Flores-Villar
and split 4-4, with Justice Kagan recusing herself.103 Lynch v. MoralesSantana will also be decided by eight justices, but this time Justice
Kagan could provide the fifth vote needed to break the tie.
A. The Court Should Apply Intermediate Scrutiny
The scheme established by §§ 1401 and 1409 is facially sex
discriminatory because it applies a longer physical presence
98. Id. at 39.
99. Id. at 41 (citation omitted).
100. Id. at 41–42.
101. See id. at 48 (“[S]uch a remedy neither exceeds judicial authority nor violates
congressional intent.”).
102. See id. at 50 (“Curing the statute of its constitutional defect would ‘confirm
[respondent’s] pre-existing citizenship rather than grant [him] rights that [he] does not now
possess.’”).
103. Flores-Villar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312, 2313 (2011).
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requirement to unwed citizen fathers than it does to unwed citizen
mothers. The Court has repeatedly established that laws drawing
distinctions on the basis of gender must be reviewed under
intermediate scrutiny.104
The Court should reject the Government’s argument to apply a
more deferential standard of review because Congress’s plenary
power over naturalization and immigration is not implicated in this
case.105 Here, Morales-Santana is claiming to have pre-existing
citizenship at birth.106 This is distinct from deciding which foreigners
to admit or exclude, which forms the heart of Congress’s immigration
powers.107 Congress has also defined the term “naturalization” in a
way that plainly excludes at-birth citizenship.108 Furthermore, the
Court has never used a lower standard of review in deference to
Congress’s plenary power to determine the constitutionality of
statutes concerning citizenship at birth.109 Fiallo v. Bell is
distinguishable in that the petitioners in Fiallo sought a special
immigration benefit, which implicated Congress’s immigration
powers, whereas Morales-Santana is claiming pre-existing citizenship,
which does not.110
B. The Gender-Based Physical Presence Requirement Scheme Violates
Equal Protection
For a discriminatory gender-based classification to survive
intermediate scrutiny it must be “substantially related” to the
achievement of an important governmental interest.111 The
104. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003); United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994).
105. See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 97 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 480–81 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting)) (“Because §§ 1401 and
1409 govern the conferral of citizenship at birth, and not the admission of aliens, the ordinary
standards of equal protection review apply.”) .
106. Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 521, 528 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct.
2545 (2016).
107. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 795 n.6 (1977) (“We are dealing here with an exercise
of the Nation’s sovereign power to admit or exclude foreigners . . . .”).
108. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(23) (2012) (“The term ‘naturalization’ means the conferring of
nationality of a state upon a person after birth, by any means whatsoever.”) (emphasis added).
109. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 480 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court to my knowledge has
never said, or held, or reasoned that statutes automatically conferring citizenship ‘at birth’ . . .
receive a more lenient standard of review.”).
110. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 96 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Fiallo . . . is readily
distinguished. Fiallo involved constitutional challenges to various statutory distinctions . . . that
determined the availability of a special immigration preference . . . .”).
111. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (citation omitted).
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justification for the classification cannot “rely on overbroad
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences
of male and females.”112 “The burden of justification is demanding
and it rests entirely on the State.”113 Here, the Government has failed
to meet that burden.
The gender-based physical presence requirement scheme is not
substantially related to ensuring children born abroad have strong ties
to the United States. The Government argues that “mother” is used as
a neutral term signifying a child born out of wedlock’s only legally
recognized parent at birth, so those children are less likely to be
subjected to competing national influences.114 This argument only
makes sense if one assumes that the unwed father will not be involved
in the child’s life.115 This type of assumption is not permissible116 and
reflects “a historic regime that left women with responsibility, and
freed men from responsibility, for nonmarital children.”117 It also
ignores the reality that today many fathers are raising their children as
single parents,118 many non-marital births take place in cohabiting
households,119 and that many fathers acknowledge paternity for their
non-marital children in the hospital at the time of the child’s birth.120
What really undercuts the legitimacy of this interest is the poor fit
between the differing gender-based physical presence requirements
and the Government’s purported justification. The physical presence
requirement scheme allows an unwed citizen mother to transmit
citizenship to her child, even if she only spent the first year of her life

112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
114. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 66, at 9.
115. Brief for Respondent, supra note 11, at 20–21.
116. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (stating that justifications for gender classifications “must
not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities or preferences of
males and females”).
117. Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 92 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
118. See Gretchen Livingston, Pew Research Center, The Rise of Single Fathers (July 2,
2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/07/02/the-rise-of-single-fathers (stating that in 2013
single fathers accounted for 24% of single parent households).
119. See Carl Haub, Rising Trend of Births Outside Marriage, POPULATION REFERENCE
BUREAU (Apr. 2013), http://www.prb.org/publications/articles/2013/nonmarital-births.aspx
(finding that from 20062010 42% of nonmarital births in the United States occurred in
cohabitating households).
120. See Ronald Mincy et al., In-Hospital Paternity Establishment and Father Involvement in
Fragile Families, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 611, 623 (2005) (finding that paternity is established
for 70% of nonmarital children with six of seven paternities established through “voluntary inhospital programs”).
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in the United States and has no plans to return.121 In contrast, an
unwed citizen father who spent the first eighteen years of his life in
the United States before leaving cannot pass on U.S. citizenship at
birth to his child.122 It is not logical to think that a mother who has not
been in the United States since infancy is better equipped to pass on
strong ties to the United States than a father who lived there for
eighteen years.
The Government’s purported interest in reducing statelessness is
no more convincing. Scholars concur that gender discrimination in
citizenship laws “is a major cause of statelessness” and the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has made
removing gender discrimination from such laws an integral part of its
plan to eliminate statelessness.123
In 1958 and still today, there is a substantial risk that children born
abroad to unmarried U.S. citizen fathers will be stateless.124 In at least
thirty countries an unwed mother either could not or currently cannot
provide her citizenship to her non-marital child.125 By placing a
substantial burden, that is sometimes impossible to satisfy, on unwed
U.S. citizen fathers, § 1401(a)(7) exacerbates the risk that children
born in these countries will be stateless.126 Because the gender-based
physical presence scheme actually increases the problem the
Government alleges Congress was trying to solve, it is not
substantially related to this interest.
C. The Second Circuit Applied the Correct Remedy
The Court should affirm the Second Circuit’s decision to extend
the benefit of the shorter, one-year, continuous presence requirement
to unwed citizen fathers. The goal of remedying equal protection
violations is to “place persons unconstitutionally denied an

121. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1952) (stating that a child born abroad to an unwed citizen
mother gains U.S. citizenship at birth “if the mother had previously been physically present in
the United States or one of its outlying possession for a continuous period of one year”).
122. See § 1401(a)(7) (requiring that unwed citizen fathers be physically present in the
United States “for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were
after attaining the age of fourteen years”).
123. Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars on Statelessness in Support of Respondent at 12, Lynch
v. Morales-Santana, NO. 15-1191 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2016).
124. Id. at 9–10.
125. Id. at 14.
126. Note that because § 1401(a)(7) required that an unwed father be present in the U.S.
for at least five years after the age of fourteen prior to his child’s birth, it is impossible for a
father under the age of nineteen to provide citizenship to his child under this statute.
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opportunity or advantage in ‘the position they would have occupied
in the absence of [discrimination].’”127 Applying the ten-year physical
presence requirement to both genders moving forward would not
achieve this goal. Citizenship has already been granted under the
statute to children of unwed citizen mothers and once citizenship has
been conferred it cannot be retracted.128 This means that even though
mothers and fathers would be treated equally moving forward,
equality has not been restored because an unwed U.S. citizen mother
who has already provided citizenship at birth to her child gets to
retain that benefit, while an unwed citizen father, like MoralesSantana’s, still has not had that same opportunity.
Additionally, when deciding on a remedy, the Court looks to
Congress’s intent when enacting the statute.129 Unless there is clear
congressional intent otherwise, “ordinarily ‘extension, rather than
nullification is the proper course.’”130 For example, in Califano v.
Westcott, the Court remedied an unconstitutional gender classification
in the Social Security Act, which provided benefits to families with
dependent children when a father but not a mother became
unemployed, by replacing “father” with “its gender-neutral
equivalent.”131 This had the effect of ensuring that benefits would be
“paid to families with an unemployed parent on the same terms that
benefits have long been paid to families with an unemployed
father.”132 The Court noted that extension of benefits conformed with
Congress’s intent in drafting the statute because withdrawing benefits
would “impose hardship on beneficiaries whom Congress plainly
meant to protect.”133 Similarly, withdrawing the benefit of the oneyear continuous presence requirement would contradict Congress’s
intent to provide at birth citizenship to mothers meeting this
requirement.

127. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)).
128. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967) (holding that every citizen has “a
constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that
citizenship”).
129. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 292 n.31 (1987) (“[T]he Court
must look to the intent of the . . . legislature to determine whether to extend benefits or nullify
the statute.”).
130. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739 n.5 (1984) (quoting Califano v. Westcott, 443
U.S. 76, 89 (1979)).
131. 443 U.S. at 91–93.
132. Id. at 92.
133. Id. at 90.
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Furthermore, the Second Circuit has not exceeded its authority by
holding that Morales-Santana obtained U.S. citizenship at birth from
his father. Morales-Santana claims to have pre-existing citizenship at
birth. The Second Circuit merely confirmed his pre-existing
citizenship by excising the constitutional defect in the statute which
does not contravene Congress’s plenary power over naturalization.134
CONCLUSION
Sections 1401 and 1409 facially discriminate against unwed citizen
fathers and reflect stereotypical views that women, not men, are
children’s natural caretakers. The Court should find that the different
physical presence requirements violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal
protection guarantee and should remedy this violation by extending
the shorter physical presence requirement to both unwed citizen
mothers and fathers.

134. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 432 (1998) (plurality opinion) (“[J]udgment in
[plaintiff’s] favor would confirm her pre-existing citizenship rather than grant her rights that she
does not now possess.”); see also id. at 488–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)
(“Whatever limitations there may be upon a Court’s powers to grant citizenship, those
limitations are not applicable here . . . . The statute itself grants citizenship automatically, and
‘at birth.’ And this Court need only declare that that is so.”).

